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ABSTRACT 
Most people say that a hearts and minds campaign is the best 
strategy for defeating an insurgency. But there may be no one best 
solution applicable to countering all insurgencies. The opportunities 
and constraints, which affect both the insurgent and state, dictate the 
best strategy. I will test this hypothesis against the most difficult 
form of insurgency. Two Maoist insurgencies will be analyzed to 
determine the effect of the state's strategy on the insurgent. 
Conclusions will then be drawn about the relevance of pursuing a 
universal counter-insurgency strategy. 
While countering the Shining Path insurgency in Peru, the state 
employed three different strategies. In the end, the state recognized 
that the insurgency was elitist based and launched a successful counter-
leadership targeting campaign to defeat the insurgency. While 
countering the Malayan Communist Party insurgency in Malaya, the state 
employed two different strategies. In the end, the state recognized 
that the insurgency could be limited to the ethnic Chinese community and 
adopted a successful campaign to separate the insurgents from the 
population. 
Analysis of each case study clearly demonstrates the success of 
two different strategies against similar insurgent organizations. In 
Peru the insurgency was defeated thanks to an inside-out approach, while 
in Malaya the insurgency was defeated form the outside-in. The strategy 
used in Peru would not have been successful in Malaya and the same can 
be said of the Malayan strategy in Peru. However, the cases demonstrate 
the need to understand general counter-insurgency principles before 
applying case specific strategies. Based on these observations it can 
be concluded that, just as the principles of war guide military 
operations, there are similar principles which bring success in counter-
insurgency operations, with the important caveat that every case must be 
treated as unique. 
v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
A. PURPOSE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
B. METHODOLOGY ..................................... 1 
C. ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
D. DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
II. PERUVIAN INSURGENCY .................................. 7 
A. PRECONDITIONS .................................. 10 
B. RELEVANCE OF CASE STUDY ........................ 12 
C. INSURGENT STRATEGY ............................. 12 
D. POLICE ACTION STRATEGY ......................... 15 
E. EFFECTS OF POLICE ACTION STRATEGY .............. 17 
F. "DIRTY WAR" STRATEGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 
G. EFFECTS OF DIRTY WAR STRATEGY .................. 19 
H. HEARTS & MINDS STRATEGY ........................ 20 
I. EFFECTS OF HEARTS & MINDS STRATEGY ............. 22 
J. INSIDE-OUT STRATEGY ............................ 24 
K. EFFECTS OF INSIDE-OUT STRATEGY ................. 30 
L. CONCLUSIONS .................................... 32 
III. MALAYAN INSURGENCY .................................. 37 
A. PRECONDITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9 
B RELEVANCE OF CASE STUDY ........................ 42 
C. INSURGENT STRATEGY ............................. 43 
D. INITIAL RESPONSE ............................... 46 
E. EFFECT OF THE INITIAL RESPONSE ................. 49 
F. THE BRIGGS PLAN ................................ 52 
vii 
G. EFFECT OF THE BRIGGS PLAN ...................... 54 




EFFECT OF THE TEMPLER PLAN ..................... 58 
THE BOURNE PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 
EFFECT OF THE BOURNE PLAN ...................... 60 
L. CONCLUSIONS .................................... 61 
IV. CONCLUSIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 
A . LESSONS OF PERU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3 
B. LESSONS OF MALAYA .............................. 66 
C. COULD MALAYAN LESSONS BE USED IN PERU? ......... 67 
D. COULD PERUVIAN LESSONS BE USED IN MALAYA? ...... 68 
E. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS .......................... 69 
LIST OF REFERENCES .................................. 73 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ........................... 79 
viii 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Sendero Armed Actions in Peru, 1980 to 1990 .... 33 
Figure 2. Sendero Armed Actions by Area, 1980 to 1990 .... 34 
Figure 3 Political Violence in the Central Region ....... 35 
ix 




LJ:ST OF MAPS 
Map of Peru, .................................... 7 
Map of Malaya. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 7 
Xl 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
xii 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The author wishes to thank Professors Anna Simons and 
Gordon McCormick for their extensive guidance and patience 
throughout this work. 
xiii 





Most people say that a hearts and minds campaign 
offers/represents the best strategy for defeating an 
insurgency. But there may be no one best solution for 
countering all insurgencies. The opportunities and 
constraints, which affect both the insurgents and the 
state, dictate the best strategy. I will test this 
hypothesis against the most difficult form of insurgency. 
Two Maoist insurgencies will be analyzed to determine the 
effect of the state's strategy on the insurgent. 
Conclusions will then be drawn about the relevance of 
pursuing a universal counter-insurgency strategy. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
Case study analysis is the methodology used in this 
thesis. The two cases used are Peru from 1980 to 1995 and 
Malaya from 1948 to 1960. The Peruvian case study offers 
three different counter-insurgency strategies and their 
effect on a Maoist-based insurgency. The Malayan case 
study involves two different counter-insurgency strategies 
and their effect on a Maoist-based insurgency. The range 
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of government strategies includes both direct and indirect 
assaults against the insurgent organization, its 
leadership, and its links to the population. 
Case selection was based on three criteria: 1) were 
the insurgencies Maoist-based, 2) were the insurgencies 
internal to the country, and 3) could the insurgencies have 
succeeded? Ever since the Chinese revolution (1940-1950) 
Maoist-based insurgencies have proven to be the most 
difficult to defeat. Therefore, selecting Maoist-based 
insurgencies to study provides a very tough test to 
evaluate. Vietnam is probably the most documented Maoist-
based insurgency in history. 
criteria for case selection. 
thrown out because in 
sponsorship, escalation to 
However, it did not meet my 
The Vietnam case study was 
Vietnam there was outside 
conventional war, and a 
government committed to fighting the insurgency with only a 
conventional strategy. In contrast, in Peru and Malaya 
there was a fair chance of success for both sides, 
similarly structured insurgent organizations, no outside 
sponsorship, and multiple strategies by which to measure 
the players' effectiveness. 
2 
.. 
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS 
In Chapter II of the thesis I examine the Peruvian 
case, and explore three different strategies: of first 
attacking the insurgency directly, then indirectly with a 
hearts and minds campaign, and finally indirectly with a 
counter leadership targeting campaign. In Chapter III I 
analyze the Malayan case and examine the two strategies 
used there: of first attacking the insurgency directly, 
then indirectly with a population and food control 
campaign. Chapter IV of this thesis compares lessons 
learned from both case studies, determines whether the 
winning strategies were interchangeable, and finally draws 
conclusions about the relevance of a universal counter-
insurgency strategy. 
D. DEFINITIONS 
The following are important concepts used in this 
thesis: 
Maoist Based Insurgency: 
This type of insurgency originated in China under 
Mao Tse-tung. Mass-oriented insurgency relies on 
the mobilization of very large numbers of people 
into an alternative government with many highly 
specialized political and military agencies. It 
bases its mobilization on a clear identification 
of social dysfunctions and an appealing program 
3 
for fundamental political change. The element of 
popular participation is such that the method can 
be consistent with US values and objectives. 
Mass-oriented insurgency combines political and 
military resources to attack and destroy the 
existing government. Therefore, organized 
military action will probably be a necessary part 
of a program to counter it. {Field Manual 100-20, 
Appendix D} 
Direct approach to defeating an insurgency: 
This concept involves the use of conventional military 
forces to engage guerrilla fighters using the same tactics 
that would be directed against another conventional force 
{McCormick, 2000}. In the Peruvian case this is epitomized 
by the Argentine strategy which was used throughout Latin 
America in the 1960s to put down insurgencies. This 
strategy had military units conducting search and destroy 
missions in jungle areas where insurgent activity was 
thought to occur. This same tactic was used early on in 
Malaya to put pressure on large guerrilla base camps hidden 
in the jungle. 
Outside-in approach to defeating an insurgency 
This is an indirect approach to countering an 
insurgency which involves attacking the outside edges of an 
insurgent organization first {these are much easier to see 
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and target) and slowly working towards the center (which is 
very difficult to see and target) (McCormick, 2000). In 
Peru, President Garcia attempted to target the population 
of Peru first with a hearts and mind campaign that he hoped 
would result in the exposure of senior leadership. In 
Malaya, the British instituted a plan to separate the 
insurgents from the population via food and population 
control. They believed that if they controlled the 
population the insurgents would have no one to exploit, 
therefore resulting in their defeat. 
Inside-out approach to defeating an insurgency 
This is an indirect approach to countering an 
insurgency by targeting the leadership of an insurgent 
organization first and slowly working down to the local 
levels of insurgent activity (McCormick, 2000). The 
presumption is that if the masses have no leadership, the 
insurgency will fracture and lose its strategic vision, 
dropping it below the level of posing a real threat to 
those in power. In Peru, the reformed security police 
forces conducted a counter-leadership targeting campaign 
against the Shining Path. Once the leader of the Shining 
Path was captured, members began to turn on one another 
regarding the direction of the insurgency, which resulted 
5 
in the arrest of more key leaders and the inability of the 
organization to pose a threat to governmental authority. 
6 
II. THE PER'OV'IAN :INSURGENCY 




The Peruvian Government's defeat of the Shining Path's 
insurgency, also known as Sendero Luminoso, offers a good 
example of how a short-term approach to defeating an 
insurgency from the inside-out can be successful. The 
Peruvian Government tried to attack the Shining Path via 
three different strategies. At first it tried to attack 
the manifestation of the problem with a conventional 
campaign (short-term direct assault) . Second, a hearts and 
minds campaign was used (long term indirect assault). And 
finally, a counter-leadership targeting campaign (short-
term inside-out direct assault) was used. I intend to show 
that an insurgency can be defeated in the short-run without 
the long-term benefits of social, political, and economic 
changes, the need for which lent legitimacy to the 
insurgency in the first place. 
Implementation of an effective short-run strategy carne 
only after a decade of failure in Peru. During the 1980s, 
both Peruvian Presidents Belaunde and Garcia failed to 
defeat the insurgency. The government did not make a 
credible effort to understand the strengths and weaknesses 
of the Shining Path prior to implementing a national 
strategy. Instead, Belaunde attempted to use the atypical 
Latin American counter-insurgency strategy of conventional 
8 
armed response (attacking the manifestation of the problem) 
while Garcia adopted the hearts and mind campaign 
(attacking the problem over the long-term) as used in South 
East Asia. 
The crisis in Peru seemed to climax in 1991 when the 
Shining Path declared it had reached a state of strategic 
equilibrium with the Peruvian government and victory would 
come within the decade. This claim was backed up by the 
testimony of leading Peruvian experts during u.s. 
Congressional hearings in the summer of 1992. 
Ironically however, just as Sendero was on the verge 
of victory, the strategic initiative switched back in favor 
of the Peruvian Government with the capture of Aleman 
Guzman (leader of the Shining Path) in September of 1992. 
By 1999 (which marked Guzman's "no later than date" for 
overt.hrow of the Peruvian Government) all the original 
founding fathers of the Shining Path had been either killed 
or captured. Sendero never recovered from these key 
leadership losses and its ability to pose a credible threat 
to the government was over. 
First, I will offer a brief explanation of the pre-
conditions leading up to the conflict. Second, I will 
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analyze President Belaunde's short-term strategy of 
attempting to attack the manifestation of the problem with 
a conventional assault on Sendero and the population, 
otherwise called a "dirty war" (Poole, 1992, p. 6). Third, 
I will examine President Garcia's long-term strategy of a 
hearts and mind campaign, otherwise called an "internal 
war" (Mauceri, 1991, p. 98). Fourth, I will demonstrate 
how President Fujimori executed a short-term strategy 
directed at defeating the Shining Path leadership, which 
ultimately resulted in success. Finally, conclusions will 
be drawn on how intelligence-driven strategy, such as 
counter-leadership targeting, presents an effective 
alternative to defeating an insurgency from the inside-out 
in the short-run. 
A. PRECONDITIONS 
During the 1970s Peru was divided along cultural, 
social, political, and economic lines. Culturally, the 
country was comprised of two Perus, the Peru of the Sierra, 
with roots in Indian culture, and the Peru of the coast, 
with roots in Spanish culture (McCormick, 1992). Socially, 
the country was split by a class system based primarily on 
race and secondary on education (Cadena, 1995). 
10 
Politically, the country had a long history of civilian 
subordination to the military. In the twelve years of 
military rule preceding the Shinning Path's insurgency the 
political parties of Peru were constantly co-opted by the 
military regime into supporting whatever policies the 
military leaders favored at the time. Economically, Peru 
retained a semi-feudal economy in the countryside, while 
the failed social experiment of the left-wing military 
dictatorship (1968-1980) created rising inflation, a large 
debt, and the flight of foreign investors from the country 
(Hinojosa, 1998, p. 66) . 
Analyzing these preconditions helps us understand why 
Aleman Guzman would have considered the use of armed 
conflict to be the only viable method for bringing about 
political change. This realization seems to have resulted 
from a rational decision on his part. Politically, we see 
Guzman break off from the Peruvian Communist Party after 
his disgust at its inability to bring about political 
change and his sense that the worldwide communist effort 
had lost its revolutionary appeal (Hinojosa, 1998, pp. 66-
7 6) . Once Guzman had the political justification for his 
effort all he needed was an ideology by which to organize 
his followers. 
11 
B. RELEVANCE OF CASE STUDY 
Both the government and the insurgents were bound by 
opportunities and constraints, which gave each side an 
opportunity for victory. The state proved to have a 
formidable military force, stable government, and 
experience in suppressing insurgencies. The Shining Path 
had the social and economic preconditions necessary to add 
legitimacy to its armed rebellion along with a superior 
organizational strategy. Throughout the course of the 
insurgency both sides demonstrated the capability to strike 
at each other's weaknesses. Geographically, the state 
controlled the urban centers along the coast while the 
Shining Path had freedom of maneuver in the marginalized 
areas of the Sierra (Peru Country Study, 1993). 
C. INSURGENT STRATEGY 
Ideologically, Carlos Mariategui, a Peruvian communist 
during the 1940s, influenced Guzman. Guzman understood 
Mariatequi' s concept of the Peru of the coast controlling 
the Peru of the Sierra (McCormick, 1990, p. 4). Righting 
this imbalance would be the mobilizing principle behind 
Guzman's insurgency. Guzman would name his revolutionary 
organization after the Shining Path of Mariategui. 
12 
Guzman's style of Peruvian communism would come to 
represent a synthesis of Marxism, Leninism, Maoism and 
Mariateguism (McCormick, 1990, p. 4). This synthesis was 
characterized by the adoption of "people's war" from Mao, 
social purges from Joseph Stalin, Peruvian socialism from 
Mariategui, and communism from Karl Marx. Understanding 
this amalgamation gives us insight into why the 
organization was so violent; it borrowed violence from four 
different sources. 
Guzman split off from the Peruvian Communist Party 
during the 1970s. He began his recruitment and 
indoctrination of his initial cadre members at the 
University of San Cristobal de Huamanga in the department 
of Ayacucho. The Shining Path would spend almost a decade 
building political and support bases before it began its 
armed struggle in 1980. Mao's three-phase strategy of 
"people's war" would be modified into a five-step plan. 
These are (1) agitation and armed propaganda; 
(2) sabotage against Peru's socioeconomic system; 
(3) the generalization of the guerrilla struggle; 
(4) the conquest and expansion of the 
revolution's support base and the strengthening 
of the guerrilla army; and (5} general civil war 
the siege of the cities and the final collapse of 
the state power (McCormick, 1990, p. 15}. 
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Following Maoist principles the Shining Path created a 
new revolutionary government as it worked to destroy the 
existing state structure. The Shining Path would penetrate 
villages and urban communities, set up a shadow government 
concealed behind front organizations, and establish support 
bases. Bolstered by either the active or passive support 
of the population, the Shining Path could then wage armed 
resistance to drive out what was left of the Peruvian 
government. Penetration initially occurred in the rural 
districts where the government had little or no presence 
and in the outlying shantytowns of the cities where 
impoverished and disenfranchised masses congregated 
(McCormick, 1990). 
Guzman's adoption of a primarily Maoist-based 
insurgency presented a style of insurgent warfare new to 
Latin America. The Shining Path maintained its five-step 
strategy throughout the insurgency and only changed by 
shifting in and out of the different phases in reaction to 
the government's strategy. The violence against civilians 
by the Shining Path would escalate, however, negatively 
affecting Sendero's relationship with the population. 
Two causes can be attributed to this increase in 
violence. First, the loss of initial cadre members and 
14 
recruitment of younger 1 less educated local corrunanders or 
"mandos 11 (Pino/ 1998. P. 169) shifted Sendero/s violence 
from selective targeting to mass punishment against anyone 
suspected of being/ or being related to/ a government 
informant (Degregori/ 1998/ p. 134). Additionally/ Guzman 
himself called for an overall increase in violence in 1983 
in an attempt to increase the amount of government 
retaliation. I will later argue that it was this violence 
which created an opportunity for the government to win the 
hearts and minds campaign against Sendero in certain 
districts. 
D. POLICE ACTION STRATEGY 
Past Peruvian insurgencies had been more of the "foco II 
or Cuban style insurgency and quick retaliation by Army 
troops provided the strategic answer to the problem of 
violence. President Belaunde (President from 1980 to 1985) 
developed his strategy of a conventional assault on the 
Shining Path given Peru/s past experiences. Belaunde/s 
conventional strategy was to first use police and then 
military forces to hunt down and kill or capture all 
guerilla forces in the field. He recognized the guerilla 
15 
army as the problem and believed its destruction would 
result in the end of the insurgency. 
The organizational and resource mobilization 
capabilities of the insurgency were not addressed by the 
Belaunde strategy. Limiting the strategy to attrition 
warfare in an environment where preconditions favored the 
insurgent doomed President Belaunde's strategy from the 
start. Belaunde sought to defeat the Shining Path in the 
short-run and failed to recognize that the Shining Path 
could mobilize resources faster than the government could 
destroy resources. 
Early on President Belaunde attempted . to dismiss the 
Shining Path as a criminal movement. He failed to identify 
it as an insurgency. He could not believe an insurgency 
was possible with the return of Peru to civilian control 
from the military in the early 1980s. Therefore, Belaunde 
considered the Shining Path to be a group of banditos, who 
could easily be rounded up by the local police forces. 
President Belaunde gave the responsibility of 
defeating the Shining Path to the Ministry of the Interior 
from 1980 to 1983. During this period, the Peruvian 
Government was more focused on outside threats to its 
16 
national security rather than on domestic threats (Hudson, 
p. 278-289). As a consequence, the Shining Path was 
misdiagnosed as a "foco" type of insurgency made up of a 
small cadre which was sponsored by an outside force (Poole, 
1992, p. 5 & Mauceri, 1991, p. 93). 
E. EFFECTS OF POLICE ACTION STRATEGY 
The unintended effect of assigning the Shining Path 
problem to the police was to allow the Shining Path freedom 
of maneuver in all areas where the state had little or no 
presence. Worse, the police forces proved unable to deal 
with the Shining Path during this period, in large part 
because they were poorly paid, 
supported (Hudson, p. 294-302). 
trained, equipped, and 
The Shining Path took 
advantage of police weaknesses and conducted several 
assassinations of policemen in Ayacucho district during 
this period and its efforts to undermine the Government 
dramatically increased. 
Two leading Sendero experts have gathered statistical 
evidence to demonstrates this point. Data provided from 
Nelson Manrique's analysis of the "War for the Central 
Sierra" demonstrates that political violence in the 
Ayacucho district rose from around 50 acts to over 400 
17 
between 1980 and 1983 (Manrique, 1995, pp. 194-195). 
Gordon McCormick's RAND analysis of Sendero's attacks 
supports this data by showing an increase in Sendero 
actions countrywide, from under 250 to around 2000 during 
this same period, see figure 1 (McCormick, 1992, p. 21) . 
Therefore, during the period when they were being directly 
assaulted by police forces the Shining Path experienced an 
almost 400% growth rate in violence and activity. 
F. "Dl:RTY WAR" STRATEGY 
With the situation in the district of Ayacucho 
worsening and Sendero activities beginning to increase in 
Lima, Belaunde turned to the mi 1 i tary to stop the 
insurgency in 1982 (Mauceri, 1991 p. 90). General Clemente 
Noel Moral was placed in charge of the Ayacucho emergency 
zone and was granted complete political and military 
authority. His counterinsurgency strategy consisted of 
direct punishment of all persons suspected of being, or 
supporting, guerrillas. 
This internal war strategy was copied from the 
Argentine approach to counterinsurgency, which proved 
effective during the 1960s. The short-term effects of 
General Clemente's strategy led to a sharp drop in Shining 
18 
Path attacks in both the Ayacucho district and Lima (see 
McCormick and Manrique graphs). The unintended consequence 
of the strategy, however, was an extreme distrust and 
hatred of the military by the local population. 
G. EFFECTS OF "DIRTY WAR" STRATEGY 
The immediate effect on the Shining Path was the death 
of many of the university cadre initially trained by Guzman 
in the Ayacucho district. The Shining Path retreated from 
areas of government control to new areas where the 
government forces were absent. Also, new, less experienced 
cadre had to be recruited to replace the key leaders killed 
or captured during the government's dirty war. Many people 
in areas vacated by guerrilla forces felt a sense of 
betrayal and abandonment after the withdrawal of insurgent 
forces. 
The government did not follow up on this opportunity 
created by the Shining Path's departure. Instead of 
pacifying of the abandoned population the military's harsh 
retaliation led to Peru rising to the top of the 
international communities human rights abuse list, thus 
further alienating the Belaunde Regime from both the local 
and international community. Belaunde's strategy, although 
19 
initially successful at reducing the ability of the Shining 
Path to mobilize resources 1n specific local areas, 
increased the Shining Path's overall ability to mobilize 
resources across the entire country. The five years 
following the Belaunde crackdown would see Shining Path 
activities more than double countrywide (see figure 3). 
H. HEARTS AND MINDS STRATEGY 
President Garcia carne to power in 1985 by running on a 
platform aimed at reducing the brutality and corruption of 
the Belaunde regime. Garcia's strategy was to win the 
hearts and minds of the Peruvian people. This strategy can 
only be implemented over the long term and insurgents can 
make its implementation difficult by their continuing 
attack on infrastructure and commerce. Garcia ran his 
presidential campaign on a platform of social, economic, 
and military reforms to end the internal unrest. However, 
it turns out President Garcia did not have the economic, 
political, or military backing to sufficiently prosecute a 
hearts and mind campaign against the Shining Path. The 
Garcia years would prove to see the corruption and violence 
increase within the government, therefore creating an 
opportunity for the Shining Path to gain power. 
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Upon taking office President Garcia relieved the 
commander of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, commander of the 
Second Military Region, and the commander of the Ayacucho 
emergency district in an effort to repair the damaged 
civil/military relationship which resulted from the 
repressive tactics used by the military under Belaunde. 
However, the military was itself divided about how to 
defeat the insurgency. Some officers supported the Garcia 
"developmentalist" approach while others still firmly 
believed in the "dirty 







counterinsurgency operations in his emergency zone provided 
evidence of this split (Mauceri, 99} . Without unity of 
effort the military continued its retaliatory punishment 
against prisoners and villagers, reinforcing the civilian 
distrust of the military, and therefore increasing the 
Shining Path's ability to mobilize more resources. 
Garcia made a small attempt to attack the Shining 
Path's organizational and resource mobilization 
capabilities through a peasant mobilization effort. But it 
is evident that Garcia did not fully support this short-
term approach because it was never sufficiently funded. 
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In an effort to promote a more robust civil defense 
and to separate the insurgents from the population, 
President Garcia reinstated the Ronda program in rural 
Peru. The Rondas were an organization of villagers who 
banded together to protect local communities against cattle 
rustlers and bandits during the 1970s and 1980s in Northern 
Peru (Starn, 1998, p. 235). However, no weapons or 
training were provided to the villagers identified as new 
Rondas. Consequently, the Rondas fell prey to retaliation 
by the Shining Path for collaborating with the government. 
To make matters worse, these vigilante groups with no 
military supervision or training began to settle old feuds 
with retaliatory strikes against competing villagers and 
families. The program was thus easily accused of turning 
the insurgency into a peasant war. With the Ronda program 
only being supported in principle it tended to do more harm 
than good. 
I. EFFECTS OF HEARTS & MINDS STRATEGY 
As it turned out, Garcia's long-term hearts and mind 
strategy not only proved ineffective but actually granted 
the Shining Path even more freedom of maneuver. Overall, 
Sendero actions increased from 1500 to 3500 during the 
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Garcia administration's five-year tenure, from 1985 to 1990 
(see figure 1, p. 33). Manrique's data also supports 
McCormick's RAND statistics showing increased at tacks 
throughout all districts in the Central Region (see figure 
3, p. 35). The data sets demonstrate the Shining Path's 
readiness to enter Stage Five of its overall strategy to 
gain control: "general civil war, the siege of the cities, 
and the final collapse of state power" (McCormick, 1990, p. 
15) . 
The Shining Path gained two advantages over the 
Peruvian Government by increasing its action in Lima during 
Garcia's tenure. First, government forces would have to 
divert resources to deal with the increased threat in Lima, 
therefore creating even more freedom of maneuver 1n rural 
Peru. Second, Lima's geographic and economic dependence on 
two major road networks presented the Shining Path with an 
opportunity to isolate the capital from the rest of Peru 
(McCormick, 1992). 
By clearly failing to win the hearts and minds of the 
Peruvian people or inhibit the expansion of the Shining 
Path the Garcia strategy actually enabled the Shining Path 
to increase all facets of its operations and the capital 
city of Lima found itself precariously close to becoming 
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isolated from the rest of Peru. The shantytowns 
surrounding Lima, although patrolled by the government 
during the day, became Shining Path strongholds during the 
night. Slowly the Shining Path had worked its way from the 
marginal areas of the Sierra to the doorstep of government 
power in Lima. Tired of the empty promises and corruption 
of the Garcia Regime, the people of Peru elected a man of 
mixed origin, President Fujimori, to office. 
J. INSIDE-OUT STRATEGY 
President Fujimori based his election campaign on 
uniting the country to stop government corruption and the 
insurgency. After the election in 1991, Fujimori moved to 
consolidate power and reduce the restraints placed on the 
government's intelligence and police forces. It can be 
shown that Fuj imori' s top advisor, Vlandemire Mostestino, 
recognized that the Shining Path was dependent on its 
senior leadership for organization of its strategic 
operations. The Shining Path was therefore vulnerable to an 
internal collapse if the senior leadership could be taken 
out (inside-out strategy). 
The key to this inside-out strategy was being able to 
get intelligence about the inner workings of the Shining 
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Path. The previous two administrations proved unable to 
accomplish this task. The Fujimori government was able to 
gather intelligence on the Shining Path by a number of 
methods. First, Fujimori gained unity of effort within the 
Peruvian Government. Second, he decreased the opportunity 
cost of assisting counter terrorist forces. Lastly, he 
increased the effectiveness of the police and counter-
terrorist forces. 
The official counter-insurgency policy of the Fujimori 
Regime was a four-step plan very similar to an outside-in 
strategy. The plan called for the consolidation of 
government power, protection of key infrastructure, 
engagement of Shining Path main force units, and 
social/economic reforms (QueHacer, 1991, pp. 45-50). At 
the same time, it can also be shown that the government 
waged an unofficial campaign to kill or capture top Sendero 
leaders. I will show how the counter leadership campaign 
destroyed the inner vanguard of the organization, 
subsequently dealing it a blow from which it could not 
recover. 
Direct correlations can be seen between key arrests of 
top Sendero leadership in 1992, 1995, 1997 and 1999 and the 
shrinkage of Shining Path's influence from five regions, 
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encompassing virtually the entire country, to two small 
regions - the Huallaya Valley and the capital city of Lima. 
By the year 2000, only one member of the original Central 
Committee (a.k.a. Artimo) who had strategic control over 
Sendero remained at-large. 
Once in power, Fujimori moved quickly to combat the 
insurgency. In an effort to gain unity of effort he 
disbanded Congress in a 1991 auto coup and appointed 
Vlandemire Mostestinos leader of DINOCTE, the Peruvian 
counter-terrorist forces as head of the counter-insurgency 
effort. He enacted new counter-terrorism laws, which 
greatly reduced individual freedoms in the emergency zones 
and granted the military judicial power over all persons 
accused of subversive activities. 
This auto coup enabled Mostestinos and his counter-
subversive forces to have unrestricted control to conduct 
operations. Having been trained by the CIA on subversive 
and counter-subversive operations, and given his training 
as a military intelligence officer during the insurgency, 
Mostestinos had the tools necessary to devise an effective 
plan to attack the Sendero leadership. A free hand to spy 
on the Peruvian people and the ability to incarcerate 
people with minimal probable cause gave the national 
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security forces an effective means for extracting 
intelligence from an unwilling population. Reshaping and 
retraining intelligence and police forces to cooperate with 
each other enabled the national security forces to 
efficiently and effectively analyze and process this new 
found intelligence. 
In an effort to gain intelligence from a willing 
population, Fujimori's counter-insurgency forces understood 
they had to be able to protect the population, thereby 
lowering the opportunity costs of supporting the government 
and raising the opportunity costs of supporting the 
insurgents. Having a limited amount of resources 
(government forces) and a large area to cover Fujimori 
reshaped the Ronda program to meet this need. 
The Ronda program was made more effective by the 
actual arming and training of Ronda and civil defense 
forces. President Fujimori enhanced government and popular 
support for the program by actually visiting and praising 
Ronda members in an effort to re-instill national pride 
among the people. Weary of abuse by both the government 
and the Shining Path, peasants felt safer when armed and 
working collectively. 
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A credible effort was also made to bolster the 
perception that the government and Ronda forces were 
working together in an effort to create stability. Not 
just words but actual assistance by the military helped 
make this a short-term reality rather than simply a long-
term goal. The military was directed to conduct civic 
action programs in the emergency zones, such as rebuilding 
schools and hospitals. Districts that were considered 
emergency zones received first priority for supplies and 
money for these programs. Human rights abuses dropped off 
and a campaign to retrain ex-Shining Path members was 
reinstated. The retraining and reintroduction of former 
Shining Path members back into society offered a return to 
normalcy for a population tired of war (Trumble, 2000) . 
A pro-government propaganda campaign was launched to 
raise the image of the government while undermining the 
image of the Shining Path. Parades including military, 
police, Ronda and new, pro-government front organizations 
were conducted in an effort to revitalize national unity. 
Former Shining Path members read statements condemning the 
war and tapes of senior Sendero leaders were shown around 
the country in an effort to undermine their credibility. 
Counter-propaganda campaigns were launched to discredit 
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reports from pro-Shining Path newspapers. Literature was 
disseminated full of statistics about government victories, 
including descriptions of the capture of senior Shining 
Path leaders (Trumble, 2000). 
Under Mostestinos the entire counter-insurgency effort 
seemed to support Mostestinos' goal of attacking Sendero's 
leadership. The police and Ronda forces provided the 
defensive capability of protecting government 
infrastructure and the population, thereby allowing other 
government forces the freedom of maneuver to attack 
Sendero. By pressuring Sendero military columns in 
emergency zones the military fixed Sendero's leadership on 
waging a war of attrition instead of a Maoist peoples' war. 
The Peruvian intelligence forces worked to gain entry into 
the core of the Shining Path in order to provide DINOCTE 
(Peruvian counter-terrorist forces) the information 
required to apprehend the senior leadership (Peru Country 
Study, 1993). 
DINOCTE was the main instrument Mostestinos and 
Fujimori used to wage the war on Sendero. DINOCTE was able 
to capture two key videotapes of top Sendero leaders in 
1991 and 1995, which allowed government officials and 
intelligence specialist to put faces to the previously 
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invisible core of the Shining Path. DINOCTE also displayed 
considerable patience and restraint by waiting until 
several top officials were identified before launching 
seizure operations. The wisdom of this is evidenced in the 
high concentration of top Sendero members nabbed in each 
operation. Finally, DINOCTE proved very effective in 
extracting key information from captured Sendero prisoners. 
Each capture would lead to more names, revealed more about 
Sendero's methods, and the whereabouts of the perpetrators 
behind the Shining Path. 
K. EFFECTS OF INSIDE-OUT STRATEGY 
The Fujimori strategy proved very effective in 
reducing the ability of the Shining Path to mobilize 
resources in support of the insurgency. As stated earlier, 
the Shining Path would be reduced from operating 
effectively over the entire country to only being able to 
operate in two small regions. On a consistent basis, 
starting with the capture of Abimael Guzman on September 
16, 1992, DINOCTE was able to apprehend those who inherited 
the leadership from him. Additionally, Fujimori was able 
to get Guzman to urge his followers to give up the armed 
conflict and sign a peace agreement with the government. 
According to Peruvian newspapers and government reports, 
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Guzman's peace proclamation caused the a new armed faction, 
dubbed the Red Path, to split from the Shining Path once 
the original body ended its combat operations. The leader 
of the Red Path, Alberto Ramirez Durand (a.k.a. Feliciano) 
would subsequently be captured in July of 1999. 
The capture of Guzman and the propaganda campaign to 
prove him mortal seems to have had the greatest impact on 
breaking the wi 11 of the insurgency. Guzman was clearly 
the political entrepreneur behind the success of the 
Shining Path. While many tried to fill Guzman's shoes no 
one was sufficiently capable or in power long enough to 
operate at the same level of effectiveness. Keeping Guzman 
in prison and strictly controlling and manipulating his 
correspondence with the outside world successfully put the 
Shining Path into a state of limbo. An emergency 
revolutionary committee was 
leadership void. However, 
formed to deal with the 
continual pressure by the 
government forced the Shining Path on the defensive and, 
more importantly, raised the opportunity costs for 





different Peruvian Presidents tried three 
strategies for destroying the Shining Path 
insurgency. In the end, President Fuj imori' s campaign of 
counter leadership targeting proved an effective method for 
defeating the insurgency. In order for this inside-out 
strategy to work, the government needed detailed 
intelligence on the inner workings and leadership of the 
Shining Path. The keys to winning the intelligence battle 
proved to be unity of effort, manipulating opportunity 
costs, and the restructuring of counter-insurgency forces 
to support one another. With detailed intelligence in 
hand, DINOCTE consistently captured top Sendero leadership, 
destroying their myth of invulnerability and subsequently 
bringing about the collapse of the organization from the 
inside-out. 
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I:J:J:. THE MALAYAN INSURGENCY 




Malayan Peninsula 1948-1960 (From Thompson, 
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The British and Malayan Governments' defeat of the 
Malayan Communist Party, also know as the MCP, offers a 
good example of how to defeat an insurgency from the 
outside-in. Even though government forces prepared for a 
long-run solution to the insurgency, I will argue that the 
insurgency was defeated in the short-run once the outside 
in strategy was employed. This victory would come before 
long-term programs, such as economic, social, and cultural 
reforms designed to win the hearts and minds of the people, 
had time to take effect. 
The British and Malayan response can be divided into 
four phases lasting from 1948 until 1960, when the last 
remaining members of the MCP surrendered. First, the 
government confronted the insurgency head-on, contesting 
guerrilla units in the field, which forced the insurgency 
deeper underground. Second, when the crisis entered its 
critical stage in 1950, General Briggs laid out the 
guidelines for defeating the insurgency from the outside-in 
which stabilized the situation. Third, General Templer, in 
1952, would turn the tide of the insurgency by exploiting 
Briggs' success and shifting government security forces and 
momentum to the offense against the MCP. Finally, with the 
insurgency in remission in 1954, General Bourne continued 
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Templer's offensive actions with the systematic clearance 
of remaining MCP holdouts (Komer, 1972, pp. 17-22). 
I will demonstrate the effectiveness of the outside-in 
strategy employed by the British by examining the cause-
and-effect relationship between the British and Malayan 
Governments' responses and their correlating effects on the 
MCP. Prior to the cause and effect analysis, I will offer 
background information on the crisis by describing the pre-
conditions leading up to the insurgency, and in the course 
of this describe the strategy employed by the Malayan 
Communist Party. The cause-and-effect argument will 
highlight General Boucher's response of 1948, General 
Briggs' response of 19 50, General Templer' s response of 
1952, and finally General Bourne's response of 1954. 
Conclusions will be drawn about why the development of the 




The Japanese occupation of Malaya during World War II 
damaged the Malayan infrastructure, the Malayan economy and 
British credibility in the region. After the defeat of the 
Japanese, Great Britain moved slowly to reestablish its 
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presence in the region. Therefore, the power vacuum in the 
aftermath of World War II created an opportunity for the 
Malayan Communist Party to seize power. 
The Japanese occupation of Malaya crippled a once 
prosperous British colony. A Japanese military 
dictatorship replaced government and police authority. 
Malaya's rubber and tin industries were redirected to 
support the Japanese war effort. A longstanding hatred and 
mistreatment of the Chinese by the Japanese caused a flood 
of ethnic Chinese refugees to pour into rural Malaya. 
During these hard times the Malayan Communist Party (the 
MCP) provided the only form of organized resistance against 
the Japanese (Thompson, 1967, p. 24). 
With the defeat of the Japanese, it was difficult for 
the Malayan government to reestablish law and order. It 
did not have the money or the infrastructure to accomplish 
this on its own. In many communi ties, the MCP was the 
controlling authority, providing stability to the 
population. The British made an attempt to disarm the 
MCP's standing army, the Malayan Peoples Against Japan Army 
(MPAJA) . This effort proved unsuccessful as the MPAJA 
maintained its stockpile of weapons in preparation for the 
war against the British. Perhaps the most difficult 
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barrier to reestablishing order was dealing with the 
dislocated ethnic Chinese squatters who had become refugees 
during the war. 
Successful infiltration of the Chinese community by 
the MCP was made possible by the major cultural, social, 
political, and social differences between ethnic Chinese 
and Malayans. Differences arose along both ethnic and 
class lines. About one third of the total population was 
ethnic Chinese at the outset of the insurgency. Many 
Chinese were immigrants and, as such, retained close family 
ties. Secret societies formed social networks unique to 
the Chinese community, which made underground organization 
a possibility. Politically, the Chinese did not have a 
strong representation in Malayan politics and the British 
favored the Malayans in dealing with the administrative 
running of the country. Economically, the Chinese 
demonstrated a tireless work ethic by dominating the 
rubber, tin and merchant industries, while the Malayans 
preferred to live a less intense life of subsistence 
farming (Komer, 1972, p. 6). 
Post-World War II Malaya provided an environment 
conducive to insurgency. The government and the economy 
were severely weakened by Japanese occupation, which gave 
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the insurgents a vulnerable opponent. The jungle and 
mountainous environment comprising 90% of the country 
provided the insurgents with a place to hide. Diminished 
British credibility in the region gave the insurgents 
nationalistic appeal. Lastly, a dislocated and disgruntled 
Chinese squatter population gave the insurgents a support 
base to exploit. 
B. RELEVANCE OF CASE STUDY 
Both the government and the Malayan Communist Party 
were bound by opportunities and constraints which evened 
out any advantage one side had over the other. Both sides 
looked as though they might be victorious at different 
periods during the insurgency. Early on, from 1945 until 
1950, the MCP had the advantage. Later on, from 1950 until 
1960, the Malayan government {with British help} would have 
the advantage . Both Richard Clutterbuck and Sir Richard 
Thompson, without question the two most knowledgeable 
experts on the subject, have argued that the Malayan 
Communist Party had the potential to overthrow the Malayan 
government from a period lasting from 1945 until 1950 
{Thompson, 1967, p. 24}. 
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C. INSURGENT STRATEGY 
The Malayan Communist Party followed two different 
communist insurgency models. Lai Tek, a rumored double 
agent for the British became Secretary General of the MCP 
in 1939 and modeled the MCP on the Russian Communist Party. 
Lai Tek focused the party's activities on labor 
organization and subversion in Singapore. Lai Tek was head 
of the MCP until 1947, when Chin Peng, a military leader of 
the MPAJ during World War II, replaced him (Clutterbuck, 
1977, pp. 45-55). Chin Peng, more accustomed to open 
insurgency, followed a Maoist-based strategy. His plan was 
to liberate areas along the jungle fringes, establish free 
zones, and finally move with a people's army against the 
state (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 44). 
The two strategies employ different tactics for 
mobilizing the masses. The Russian strategy centered on a 
spontaneous uprising instigated by a vanguard which would 
infiltrate the labor unions and urban centers. In 
contrast, the Maoist strategy centered on the systematic 
takeover of the country through the establishment of 
liberated areas instigated by a vanguard which would 
infiltrate the village and rural centers. 
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The Malayan Communist Party was formed in 1927 based 
on the Russian Communist Model. It was a legal party at 
the time and its membership was almost entirely limited to 
ethnic Chinese (Padget, 19671 p 43) • The political, 
cultural, and social differences outlined earlier seem to 
be the cause of the limited support by ethnic Malayans. 
Because of the secretive nature and the organizational 
abilities of the communist party the MCP was able to 
survive Japanese occupation during World War II. 
The British, constrained by the circumstances of war, 
reluctantly assisted the Malayan Communist Party during the 
war with Japan. It was during this period that the newly 
formed Malayan Peoples Against Japan Army (MPAJA) seized 
the opportunity to prepare for an insurgency not against 
the Japanese but against their former colonial rulers, the 
British. The MPAJA would kill more Chinese civilians 
during the war than the Japanese, in essence eliminating 
any political opposition within its own community. Large 
quantities of the arms and ammunition provided by the 
British during the war were hidden away in jungle caches 
for use at a later date. The MPAJA would later be named 
the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) by Chen Peng as he 
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unveiled his plan to openly oppose the recognized Malayan 
government in 1948 (Joes, 1996, p. 84). 
Initially, the MCP kept political and military 
operations separate. At the center of the organization was 
the Central Committee Secretary General in control of the 
Politburo and Military High Command. The political side 





and lastly mass 
organizations and 
independent cells). The military side was broken down into 
regiments, companies, and platoons. After 1949 Chen Peng 
consolidated the political and military chains of command 
in a defensive move against British reaction to the 
insurgency. The state committee controlled the regiment, 
the district the company, and the branch the platoon 
(Clutterbuck, 1973, p. 171). 
The Communist Party was linked to the population 
through the Min Chong Yuen Tong (Min Yuen) , known as the 
People's Movement. The Min Yuen was a network of 
sympathizers not yet in the Communist Party, who provided 
supplies and information to the Malayan Races Liberation 
Army (MRLA) (Sunderland, 19 64a, p 7 9) . In Singapore, the 
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MCP was linked to the people through a series of open and 
secret organizations. Examples of MCP open organizations 
were trade unions, women's organizations, and student 
organizations. Examples of MCP secret organizations were 
the anti-British League (ABL}, MCP sympathizer cells, and 
the traditional Chinese Secret Societies in place before 
the insurgency. The secret organizations were responsible 
for intelligence, recruitment, and agitation {Clutterbuck, 
1973, p. 58-68}. After the communist party was declared 
illegal the entire operation went underground. 
D. INITIAL RESPONSE 
The British had experience in sponsoring and 
countering insurgencies in Africa, Asia, the Middle East, 
and the Mediterranean prior to the crisis in Malaya 
(Sunderland, 1964a, p 30). Based on these past experiences 
the first response by the British was to attack the 
insurgency directly through the use of conventional 
military operations and population control. Military units 
were tasked to pressure the MRLA in the jungle, police 
units were tasked with population control, and paramilitary 
units were tasked with protection of infrastructure. 
However, command and control of the counter-insurgency 
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effort was not unified, leaving each civil/military 
commander responsible for his own actions and planning. 
Additionally, prior British success in counter-insurgency 
operations may have led to underestimation of the MCP' s 
capabilities. Major General Boucher, in command of the 
Malaya district during this time, underestimated the time 
and effort it would take to defeat the MCP (Komer, 1972, p 
17) . 
The MCP proved much more effective than General 
Boucher estimated as it launched a campaign of terror 
against foreign businessmen, workers in the tin and rubber 
industries, and government officials. The severity of 
these attacks culminated with the assassination of two high 
level British subjects working in the rubber industry. A 
State of Emergency was quickly declared under pressure from 
political leaders back in Great Britain. The Emergency 
regulations primarily dealt with population control 
measures. They included regulations for the detention of 
people for up to two years without trial, the death penalty 
for illegal weapon possession or guerrilla assistance and, 
most importantly, the issuance of identification cards to 
all people over the age of twelve (Clutterbuck, 1966, pp. 
35-40). 
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The police force, depleted during World War II, was 
primarily responsible for controlling and protecting the 
population. However, severe expansion and training of 
additional police and security forces was needed before 
this goal could be realistically met. Great Britain 
brought in Mr. W. N. Gray as Commissioner of Police based 
on his successful operational experience in Palestine 
(Sunderland, 1964d, p 22). Although senior leadership in 
the police forces was now qualified to respond to the 
crisis it would take time to reestablish the credibility of 
the police (which had existed prior to World War II) . 
Additional Gurka and British units were dispatched to 
Malaya in response to the crisis. The plan was to conduct 
large-scale offensive operations instead of remaining in 
static defensive positions. These tactics had proven 
successful during operations conducted in Burma. The 
intent was to destroy large MRLA formations in the field 
and prevent the guerrillas from being able to mass against 
targets of opportunity. Battalions would deploy to 
troubled sectors and conduct search and attack operations 
until MRLA activity would drop off '(Sunderland, 1964a, pp. 
12 6) . 
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E. EFFECT OF IHITXAL RESPONSE 
The MCP' s strategic objectives were not affected by 
the initial British and Malayan counter-insurgency 
strategy. Attempts to undermine the government through 
attacks on infrastructure and the population continued to 
increase. What the initial response did do to the 
insurgency was to force MCP leadership to disperse and 
decentralize operations. Militarily, the MRLA switched 
from battalion-size operations to small unit operations. 
Politically, the MCP expanded its illicit organization of 
the population in support of the insurgency. 
Initially, the MRLA (the military wing or the MCP) 
used the same successful guerrilla tactics against the 
British as it did in World War II against the Japanese. 
The concept was centered on large guerrilla formations 
conducting operations out of base camps of up to 300 
personnel hidden within the jungle. Within a year ( 1948-
1949} the MRLA expanded from eight to ten regiments based 
on its ability to extract resources from the Chinese 
squatter population and stay one step ahead of the British 
militarily. 
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In 1949 the MCP realized a nationalistic uprising 
against the British was not possible due to limited support 
within the ethnic Malayan community. Chen Peng changed the 
political strategy of the insurgency to mirror the Chinese 
Maoist based model instead of the Russian based 
revolutionary model. The Maoist model was more attractive 
because the MCP was able to establish a foothold within the 
Chinese squatter community and the MRLA had experienced 
success against the Japanese with operations conducted in 
the peripheral areas of Malaya (Clutterbuck, 1973, pp. 170-
171) . 
MRLA tactical operations were decentralized in a 
precautionary effort against attacks on the large jungle 
base camps. Most battalion and brigade-size British search 
and attack operations resulted in minimal or no MRLA 
casualties. If large size security forces moved into a 
region, MRLA tactical operations would quiet down while MCP 
recruitment and indoctrination efforts continued. This 
tactic gave the illusion of government forces having an 
immediate effect while in reality the size and support of 
the MCP was growing. Increased attacks and the ability of 
the MCP to stay one step ahead of the security forces 
prompted a heated debate within the British military about 
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the effectiveness of large unit versus small unit military 
operations in an insurgency (Sunderland, 1964a, pp. 126-
137) . 
The Min Yuen provided a key link between the 
population and the insurgents. The Min Yuen provided 
supplies and recruits to the MRLA and intelligence and 
recruits for the MCP. Security forces made no concentrated 
effort to undermine the Min Yuen during these early years. 
Left unchecked, Min Yuen operations resulted in the MRLA 
growing faster than security forces could inflict 
casualties and allowed the MCP to maintain a shadow 
government within the Chinese squatter communities. 
Politically, the government could not appeal to the Chinese 
squatter community and, militarily, police forces could not 
protect or control the community. These failures allowed 








winning the war. 
Additionally, China would fall to Mao Tse-tung in 1949 
giving the MCP a moral boost while instilling a sense of 
urgency in the British high command (Clutterbuck, 1966, pp. 
55-56) . 
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F. THE BRJ:GGS PLAN 
In April 1950, Lt. General Sir Harold Briggs, a 
successful counter-insurgency commander in Burma, was 
appointed as Director of Operations for Malaya. This was a 
new position, under the High Commissioner in charge of 
Malaya, where-by the Director of Operations was granted 
operational but not supreme control over all civil and 
military forces in Malaya. Briggs would attempt to defeat 
the insurgency from the outside-in through a series of 
programs, which carne to be known as the Briggs Plan. 
Several counter-insurgency experts credit Briggs' 
principles as necessary conditions for defeating an 
insurgency. The four principles of the Briggs Plan were: 1) 
separation of the insurgents from the population, 2) unity 
of effort, 3) quality intelligence, and 4) small unit 
operations. More importantly, Briggs realized the 
insurgency was based on the insurgents, their link with the 
people, and the people themselves. Briggs' principles 
targeted each part of the insurgency and at the same time 
offered the population security. In order to implement his 
plan and allow it time to work, Briggs realized the 
counter-insurgency effort needed to be shifted to the 
defensive. Once the situation was stabilized, 
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then 
security forces could resume their efforts to turn back the 
tide of the insurgency. Unfortunately, Briggs would leave 
Malaya before both government and insurgent forces would 
feel the effects of his plan {Komer, 1972, p. 19). 
In an effort to separate the insurgents from the 
population Briggs implemented the relocation and 
resettlement of Chinese squatter populations from the 
jungle fringes to locations away from the jungle. The new 
villages were secure compounds guarded by police and 
military forces. The villages were not concentration 
camps, but offered the squatters (who had no real land 
security previously) an opportunity to gain title to land 
and have a voice in local politics. Villager 
accountability was further cemented through the 
establishment of the Home Guard program. This program made 
the villagers responsible for the defense of their 
community over time. This was essential for getting the 
ethnic Chinese who had previously stayed away from 
government service to join with the government against the 
insurgency {Sunderland, 1964c, pp. 35-36) . 
Military forces were now dispersed throughout Malaya 
at the state and district levels by the end of 1951, as the 
security forces shifted to small unit operations. The 
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enemy was no longer considered to be the decisive point of 
the insurgency. Instead, people occupied this position. 
By placing security forces with the population and by 
training the population to defend itself the insurgents 
were forced back into the jungle. Briggs wanted 
engagements to occur in the areas between the population 
centers and the jungle, instead of deep in the jungle. 
Since the insurgents relied on the people for food and 
supplies they were forced to return to the population when 
their resources ran out. As a consequence, the army no 
longer had to pursue the insurgents; the insurgents came to 
the army (Sunderland, 1964c, pp. 38) . 
G. EFFECTS OF BRIGG'S PLAN 
The population control, food control, and small unit 
operations around the relocated squatter villages severely 
disrupted the MRLA' s logistics lines and made the MRLA 
fight to the security forces strength. The population 
control measures kept the MCP out of the villages through 
the use of ID cards and checkpoints. The food control 
measures kept rice from reaching the MRLA forces in the 
jungle. Once food supplies ran out the MRLA units had to 
risk firefights with British military patrols around the 
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villages in order to eat. MRLA units could no longer 
replace combat losses easily without access to the 
villages. Indirectly, the MCP strategy was shifted to 
regaining access to the Chinese squatter villages 
(Sunderland, 1964c, p. 64). 
Despite a shift in the balance of power as the Briggs 
Plan began to take effect, there was a dramatic increase in 
violence in 1951. The increase in violence was a direct 
reflection of the MRLA's effort to regain their lost 
momentum. Additionally, the negative effects of mass 
punishment against government supporters by the MCP began 
to cause some animosity within the Chinese community 
towards the MCP. In reaction to this animosity, Chen Peng 
shifted MCP mass punishment tactics to direct targeting of 
enemies of the revolution. The 1951 MCP shift in tactics 
resulted in the death of the British High Commissioner, Sir 
Henry Gurney. This assassination provided a small tactical 
victory for the MCP. However, the MCP would win no 
strategic victories such as establishment of liberated 
zones or military defeats over security forces during this 
period (Clutterbuck, 1973, pp. 180-186). 
The MCP attempted to block resettlement through 
threats of violence and attacks on resettled villages. 
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However, by 1951 most of the resettlement was complete. 
Frustrated by the unwillingness of the majority of the 
Chinese community to openly support the insurgency, the MCP 
realized the negative effects of its terror campaign 
against the people. The MCP Central Committee issued a 
directive in October of 1951 ordering the retreat from 
terrorism to acts of subversion by directing its acts of 
violence against selected government sympathizers and 
officials instead of economic targets and resettled 
villages (Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 63). 
H. THE TEMPLER PLAN 
General Sir Gerald Templer was appointed both High 
Commissioner and Director of Operations in February of 1952 
after the assassination of Sir Gurney and General Briggs' 
tour of duty had expired. Templer exploited the 
opportunities created by the Briggs Plan. With the MRLA 
kept in check thanks to the resettlement and food control 
programs, Templer could afford to focus the security 
force's efforts on the elimination of the MCP party 
structure. With the situation having been stabilized by 
Briggs, Templer could now move to the offensive 
(Clutterbuck, 1966, p. 86). 
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Templer consolidated the intelligence-gathering effort 
by both the military and police forces under the existing 
pol'ice Special Branch. Reorganization within the Special 
Branch created an intelligence division paralleling the 
MCP's military and political organization and activities 
whereas previously it was organized to contend with 
criminal activity. Profiles and pattern analysis were now 
done on the MCP leaders and units, which helped the 
authorities map the underground networks linking the 
communists with the people. Military forces which were 
experiencing success engaging MRLA patrols, as they 
attempted to gain access to the villages, could now be 
directed against jungle camps which had been identified 
thanks to the detailed intelligence coming out of the 
police Special Branch (Sunderland, 1964b, pp. 19-25). 
Templer's second and arguably greatest contribution to 
the counter-insurgency effort was the establishment of 
White Areas. A White Area was designated a Malayan 
district or series of districts where the Government's 
Special Branch believed the MCP political organization to 
have been undermined and where MCP military forces were 
destroyed. Once an area was considered White, Emergency 




If MCP activity resumed in a White Area, full 
Regulations would go back into effect. 
Throughout the insurgency no area that had been declared 
White ever returned to the status of Black (Clutterbuck, 
1973 1 p • 194} • 
I. EFFECT OF THE TEMPLER PLAN 
Templer clearly took the initiative away from the MCP, 
which was never able to recover. For the two year period 
Templer was in charge, two thirds of the MRLA was 
eliminated, insurgent attacks decreased, and security force 
casualties decreased. In a effort to survive the MCP 
decentralized all of its military operations down to the 
level of district committee. Chin Peng eventually moved 
the Central Committee across the border to a base camp in 
Thailand to avoid potential capture. However, MCP 
organization and the Min Yuen still remained intact 
throughout much of the country (Clutterbuck, 1973, pp. 195-
199} . 
The White Area program put the MCP on the defensive. 
In Black Areas where the government began its clearing 
operations the insurgents were forced to either fight or 
flee. Almost always the insurgents fled and subsequent 
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measures were taken to prevent the insurgents from 
reentering the newly declared White Areas. Reentry was 
prevented by government security and civil defense 
programs, which made supporting the government a much more 
attractive alternate than supporting the insurgents. 
Additionally, food rations were increased in White Areas 
and the unpopular Emergency regulations were lifted. With 
limited resources the White Area Program could only work so 
fast, however, the MCP was able to continue to operate in 
an effort to survive. 
J. THE BOURNE PLAN 
General Bourne, second in command under Templer, was 
appointed Director of Operations in the summer of 1954. 
General Bourne did not deviate from his predecessor's 
outside-in strategy. He improved the efficiency of 
operations by redirecting the White Area Program to attack 
the insurgents' weak areas first and then move, with 
momentum built, to the harder areas. Additionally, 
psychological operations were conducted to encourage the 
surrender of insurgents, pacify the neutral population and 
reinforce the optimism of government supporters (Korner, 
1972, p. 21). 
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The British began moves towards Malayan independence 
under Templer and in 1955 independence became a reality. 
Great Britain still remained a close ally and protector, 
directing the counter-insurgency effort and economic 








K. EFFECT OF THE BOURNE PLAN 
However, many of the pre-
the communists with an 
eliminated with Malayan 
It would take six years for the White Area Strategy to 
force the last of the MCP hard-liners deep into the jungle 
along the Thai border. In 1955, in response to Malaya's 
independence and the elimination of the insurgency's cause 
of ending Britain's rule, Chin Peng reached out for peace. 
The new Malayan Government under Tunku Abdul Rahman offered 
acceptable terms except for the legal recognition of the 
Malayan Communist Party. Chin Peng withdrew to the jungle 
determined to die for the Communist cause. At this time 
only 2000 insurgents remained concentrated into three Black 
Areas (Clutterbuck, 1966, pp. 135-138). 
By 1960 the two remaining Black Area's in Northern 
Malaya were cleared and Chin Peng remained alone in his 
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sanctuary in Thailand. Thanks to the surrender of the MCP 
party boss in each of the two Black Areas the entire 
underground network could be rolled up. Local surrenders 
were kept secret to prevent the Central Committee from 
reestablishing underground ties to the community until it 
was too late. Once the entire network was eliminated ties 
to the population were effectively severed. To make the 
situation even more damaging to Cheng Peng, the Central 
Committee was kept in the dark about the Police Special 
Branch successes in the two Black Areas for up to six 
months {Clutterbuck, 1966, pp. 165-173). 
L. CONCLUSIONS 
Two different strategies were used to defeat the 
Malayan Communist Party. In the end, General Briggs' 
vision of separating the insurgents from the population 
{the outside-in strategy) proved an effective method for 
defeating the insurgency. In order for this outside-in 
strategy to work, the government needed to first stop the 
expansion of the insurgency and then move systematically to 
destroy it. Briggs would halt the insurgency, Templer 
would break its spirit, and Bourne would bring about its 
elimination. 
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Population and food control were the key elements to 
acrieving separation of the insurgents from the population. 
Once operations were under way to create a White Area, the 
insurgents were forced to fight to regain control of the 
area, to surrender, or to move on. By achieving 
overwhelming local superiority in a specific area the 
government was able to force the communists into a vicious 
cycle of retreat. With each government success the 
opportunity costs of supporting the insurgency increased, 
therefore presenting an effective deterrent to 
reestablishment of subversive behavior. 
In the end, with little hope of success, only the true 
believers in the conununist cause were left and they were 
forced to retreat deep into the jungle across the Thai 
border. Removed from the population, the insurgents could 
no longer disrupt either government infrastructure, or the 
economy, or intimidate the population. At this stage the 
insurgency was forced well below the level of posing a 
threat to the government and was kept at bay with a small 
number of security forces patrolling the border area. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
A. LESSONS OF PERU 
Three different strategies were employed by the 
Peruvian government to attack the Shining Path. Each 
strategy was distinctly different and affected the Shining 
Path in a different way. A conventional assault against 
the Shining Path resulted in dispersion of the guerrilla 
forces and created animosity between the government and the 
people. An ineffective hearts and minds campaign allowed 
the insurgency unrestricted freedom of maneuver, which 
almost resulted in the government's defeat. In the end, 
however, the government produced the right leadership and 
resources to defeat the insurgency with its counter-
leadership targeting strategy. 
The success of the government's counter-leadership 
targeting campaign can be attributed to several factors. 
First, the Shining Path made itself vulnerable to such a 
strategy by relying more and more on centralized control as 
the insurgency went on. Second, by centralizing its 
control of counter-insurgency operations the government was 
able to better maximize its limited resources against the 
insurgency. Third, by modernizing its 
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intelligence-
gathering agencies and capabilities the government was able 
to determine the identities and locations of the Shining 
Path's key leaders. 
The Shining Path made two strategic errors which aided 
the efforts of the Peruvian government. First, the policy 
of selectively targeting enemies of the revolution was 
changed to mass punishment of entire corrnnuni ties in 1983. 
_,Ancreased brutality and violence towards innocent people 
would have a long-term negative effect on the Shining 
Path's ability to enlist the support of the population. 
This phenomenon caused the Shining Path to be occupied on 
two fronts: one to control the population, and two to fight 
the government. Second, the Shining Path moved toward more 
centralized control of strategic operations after the loss 
of many of the original founding members by 1985. As 
Shining Path leaders were killed or captured the quality of 
their replacements was not .the same as that of the original 
founding members. This led to a greater reliance on 
centralized control and increased security by the Central 
Corrnnittee. Distrust within the organization led to 
betrayal and infighting, which distracted the Shining Path 
from its original objectives. 
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Unity of effort played a vi tal role in focusing the 
security forces of Peru on defeating the insurgency. From 
1980 to 1990 politicians/ the military/ and the police were 
divided on how to defeat the insurgency. In 1990 the 
insurgency was made the number one priority by the 
administration and all forms of government were organized 
to support one another in the counter-insurgency role. 
This focus increased the effectiveness of the intelligence 
effort/ improved civil-military relations/ and maximized 
the government/s limited resources against the insurgency. 
Detailed intelligence was a necessary condition for 
the success of the counter-leadership targeting (the 
inside-out) strategy in Peru. From 1980 to 1990 the 
intelligence-gathering effort by the Peruvian government 
was lacking and the insurgents were clearly winning the 
war. From 1990 to 1996 the intelligence-gathering 
capability improved and large numbers of key leaders were 
killed or captured. Without detailed intelligence/ key 
Shining Path leaders could not be identified and 
subsequently targeted. The capture of each key leader was 
exploited to result in more captures/ thereby creating a 
vicious cycle from which the Shining Path could not 
recover. 
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B. LESSONS OF MALAYA 
Two different strategies were used by the British to 
attack the Malayan Communist Party. In the end, the Briggs 
Plan (the outside-in strategy) proved sufficient to defeat 
the insurgency. This strategy proved effective because the 
government was able to halt the insurgents' initial 
momentum, stabilize the situation, and then take the 
offensive. The insurgents, initially in control, lost 
their momentum and were forced into a downward spiral of 
retreat. 
Effective population and food control were the 
necessary conditions for separating the population from the 
insurgents in the Malayan case. Resettlement of the 
Chinese squatters placed the population in an environment 
where it could be effectively protected and controlled. 
Food control cut off the flow of resources from the 
controlled areas to the guerrilla army (the MRLA) . 
Therefore, the MRLA was left with three choices: risk 
contact with superior security forces, retreat to more 
isolated areas, or surrender. 
choose retreat or surrender. 
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Time after time the MRLA 
Unity of effort played an important role in 
implementation of the Briggs Plan. Initially, police, 
military, and government administrators were waging the 
counter-insurgency effort as each thought best. 
Coordination of the effort was disjointed and intelligence 
and operational gaps were left open for the insurgents to 
exploit. Consolidation of the counter-insurgency effort 
under Briggs, and expansion of direct control under General 
Templer, increased the effectiveness of the intelligence 
effort and allowed the government to mass its limited 
resources systematically in the White Area program. 
C. COULD MALAYAN LESSONS BE USED IN PERU? 
Some of the same lessons learned in Malaya were 
applied in Peru. However, conditions unique to the 
geography and population of Peru undermined the ability of 
the government to separate the population from the 
insurgents in Peru. First, Peru is four times the size of 
Malaya and it also borders a hostile nation, Ecuador, in 
the south. Second, the insurgency in Peru was not limited 
to members of a single ethnic group; members of the Shining 
Path transcended ethnic and class lines. Third, the 
infrastructure linking urban and rural Peru was vulnerable 
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to disruption, enabling the Shining Path to tie down large 
numbers of security forces. Fourth, Peru had a long 
history of government repression and cruelty, which made 
population control operations look like a return to past 
government abuse. 
The proportionality of government resources to the 
size of the population and area to be controlled clearly 
favored the insurgency in the Peruvian case. If the 
government attempted to separate the population from the 
insurgents on a nationwide scale it would have been best to 
start in Lima where the government was strongest and from 
where it could work towards the mountains of central Peru. 
However, some form of offensive operations were needed to 
keep the Shining Path from establishing liberated zones in 
central Peru while the government was working to pacify 
Lima. The outside-in strategy would clearly have taken a 
long time to execute and would have given the Shining Path 
too great an advantage in rural Peru, which the government 
then might not have been able to overcome. 
D. COULD PERUVIAN LESSONS BE USED IN MALAYA? 
Running a counter-leadership targeting campaign in 
Malaya would have been very difficult. 
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First, the 
decentralized nature of the Malayan Communist Party allowed 
individual leaders to continue operations without direction 
from higher authority. Second, penetration of the close-
knit networks which comprised the Chinese community came 
only in the later years of the insurgency. Third, jungle 
strongholds in neighboring Thailand gave Chin Peng, the MCP 
leader, a secure base from which to operate. Lastly, 
limitations 
collection 
in technology forced the intelligence 
effort to be based primarily on human 
intelligence-gathering capabilities. 
E. FUTURE CONSIDERATIONS 
Analysis of both the Peruvian and Malayan case studies 
reveals that no one best strategy can be applied to all 
insurgencies. Both governments were successful in 
defeating an insurgency using two very different 
strategies. The British and Malayan governments were able 
to defeat the MCP at the grassroots level by attacking the 
MCP from outside the organization and then slowly working 
their way towards the interior. The Peruvian government 
applied a different strategy, whereby success was achieved 
by targeting and attacking the core of the Shining Path 
leadership first and then working towards the exterior. 
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Both governments changed their original strategy during the 
course of their counter-insurgency efforts. These changes 
were based on strategies that maximized the governments' 
strengths and exploited the insurgents' weaknesses. 
Both governments followed common principles, which led 
to a successful counter-insurgency program. Three of the 
four principle outlined in the Briggs plan were critical to 
success in both case studies. Those principles were: unity 
of effort, intelligence, and small unit operations. These 
principles helped to focus the government effort, to 
separate/segregate the insurgents from the population, and 
to increase the lethality of government forces. The result 
of these efforts was the stopping of the insurgents' 
momentum, the regaining of the initiative for the 
government, and the subsequent defeat of the insurgency. 
Unity of effort in both cases focused each government 
as a whole on defeating the insurgency and created mutual 
support between civil, military, and intelligence 
operations. Detailed intelligence increased the 
government's understanding of the insurgents' leadership, 
organization, and support bases. This improved 
intelligence increased the success rate of operations, 
lowered civilian casualties, and eliminated the number of 
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uneventful patrols. Small unit operations expanded the 
government's influence at the local level, increased 
tactical surprise, and increased contacts and success 
ratios of government security forces. 
Taking both these cases and the lessons to be learned 
into consideration, future counter-insurgency planners must 
understand there is more to COIN than winning the hearts 
and minds of the population. Before a government can 
execute the economic, social, political, and cultural 
reforms needed to enlist the will of the people it must 
counter the insurgents' ability to undermine the 
government's efforts. The principles outlined in the 
Briggs Plan offer future researchers a place from which to 
start. Future study should be directed towards determining 
whether Briggs' principles applied consistently or not in 
other counter-insurgency efforts. If so, how much impact 
did they have on the government's success or failure? Even 
if Briggs' principles are shown to have positive effects, 
they, like studying any general lessons learned from 
studying post COIN efforts, must be considered a set of 
list principles to consider and not a one-time solution to 
defeating all insurgencies. 
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11. Strategic Studies Group (SSG) ........................ 1 
Naval War College 
Newport, Rhode Island 02840 
12. Department of Military Strategy ...................... 1 
National War College (NWMS) 
Ft. Leslie J. McNair 
Washington, District of Columbia 20319-6111 
13. US Army Command and General Staff College ............ 1 
ATTN: Library 
Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900 
14. Library .............................................. 1 
Air War College 
Maxwell AFB, Alabama 36112-6428 
15 . US Military Academy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
ATTN: Library 
West Point, New York 10996 
16 . US Naval Academy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
ATTN: Library 
Annapolis, Maryland 21412 
17. Maraquat Memorial Library ............................ 1 
US Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center 
Rrn. C287, Bldg 3915 
Ft. Bragg, North Carolina 28307-5000 
18. US Air Force Special Operations School ............... 1 
EDO, Alison Bldg, 357 Tully St. 
Hurlburt Fld, Florida 32544-5800 
19. MAJ Michael A. Bottiglieri ........................... 1 
208 Ardennes Circle 
Seaside, CA, 93955 
80 
